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ABSTRACT
Let’s make three assumptions. First, we shouldn’t support factory 
farms. Second, if animal-friendly agriculture lives up to its name—
that is, if animals live good lives (largely free of pain, able to engage 
in species-specific behaviors, etc.) and are slaughtered in a way that 
minimizes suffering—then there is nothing intrinsically wrong with 
killing them for food. Third, animal-friendly agriculture does, in 
fact, live up to its name. Given these assumptions, it might seem dif-
ficult to criticize individuals who source their animal products from 
“animal-friendly” agricultural operations. However, I argue that they 
should drastically reduce their support for animal-friendly agricul-
ture because it isn’t scalable—i.e., if we were to switch to that form 
of agriculture, most people would be priced out of its products. I say 
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For better or worse, we’ve democratized meat-eating. 
Meat-eating is something that was a special occasion in 
most households for many years… The poor got very 
little animal protein. So one of the nice things about 
industrial meat production is it makes this human de-
sire—because it is a widespread human desire—some-
thing that even the poor could satisfy, and if we eat 
meat more responsibly, you know, it is going to be less 
democratic. (Michael Pollan, CBC Ideas)
Introduction
Let’s make three assumptions. First, we shouldn’t support 
factory farms. Second, if “animal-friendly” agriculture lives 
up to its name—that is, if animals live good lives1 and are 
slaughtered in a way that minimizes suffering—then there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with killing them for food. Third, 
“animal-friendly” agriculture does, in fact, live up to its name.
There are, of course, good reasons to reject the second and 
third assumptions—hence the quotation marks around “ani-
mal-friendly,” which I’ll now drop.2 But I’d guess that many 
people make all three. If we grant these assumptions, and if 
individuals source their animal products responsibly, is there 
any way to criticize their behavior?
I think so. In what follows, I contend that the relatively 
wealthy should eat mostly vegan even if they can afford animal-
friendly animal products. The argument for this has two prem-
1  At a minimum, this means living a life that’s largely free of human-in-
flicted pain and during which animals are able to engage in species-specific 
behaviors.
2  Against the second, see Regan (1987) and Adams (1990). Against the 
third, see Bohanec (2013) and McWilliams (2015).
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ises. First, animal-friendly agriculture isn’t scalable, which is 
to say that if we were to switch to that form of agriculture, 
most people would be priced out of its products. Second, if we 
endorse a norm during periods of moral change, then we ought 
to bear the cost that most people would bear were the norm to 
be widely accepted, even if we can afford not to. It follows that 
the relatively wealthy ought to eat as most people would if the 
animal-friendly model were adopted.
The Empirical Premise
Let’s begin with the empirical premise: if we were to switch 
to animal-friendly agriculture, most people would be priced 
out of its products. The reason to believe this claim is that it’s 
extremely difficult to sell animal products at accessible prices 
without the factory farm, and this is because longer, happier 
animal lives are more resource-intensive than short and un-
pleasant ones. First, longevity and happiness take much more 
water and feed for much less product. This is partially because 
humanely-raised animals live up to twice as long as intensive-
ly-raised animals, but also because humanely-raised animals 
convert feed to flesh less efficiently. They haven’t been bred 
to gain weight in the same ways (e.g., humanely-raised chick-
ens don’t have the massive breasts that you find in intensively-
raised chickens, since those breasts can lead to persistent joint 
pain and broken limbs), and humanely-raised animals have 
greater freedom of movement, which means that they burn off 
more of the calories that they consume. Second, minimizing 
suffering during slaughter makes the process massively less 
efficient: an industrial slaughterhouse can process 2,500 cattle 
in an eight-hour shift; mobile slaughter units—the standard 
alternative for those who champion humane agriculture—can 
process ten. Third, small farms don’t—and probably couldn’t, 
for economic reasons—recover and sell all the byproducts that 
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help keep meat prices low.3 They can recover and sell some 
byproducts, such as offal. But others only make financial sense 
when huge numbers of animals are being slaughtered, such as 
collecting bovine fetal blood for medical labs, which use it to 
create cell cultures.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, animal-friendly op-
erations require much more land than their industrial alterna-
tives. We can appreciate this point with some back-of-the-en-
velope calculations about chicken feed. Chicken feed is com-
posed of grains and various supplements, all of which have to 
be produced somewhere, somehow. But let’s simplify by pre-
tending that it’s just made of wheat, which would actually be 
a boon to animal-friendly operations if it were the case. In any 
event, you can produce about 56 bushels of wheat on an acre. 
At 60 pounds per bushel, that’s 3,360 pounds of chicken feed. 
If it takes 12 pounds of feed to bring a chicken up to slaughter 
weight, then one arable acre can feed 280 birds. But suppose 
you want to let your chickens live off the land, eating insects 
and native plants. You might want to do this for welfare reasons: 
perhaps you think that animals ought to live in an environment 
that’s as close as possible to their natural one, allowing them 
to exhibit the full range of species-specific behaviors. Alter-
nately, you might want to do this for environmental reasons. As 
Kemmerer (2015) argues, there are excellent reasons to devote 
less land to animal agriculture: e.g., the monocropping behind 
animal feed leads to soil degradation, fertilizers pollute nearby 
waterways, and extensive pesticide use is guilty of the same. 
Moreover, as the Ecological Society of America points out, for-
ests are superior to agricultural operations in terms of carbon 
3  See Norwood and Lusk (2011) and Ogle (2013).
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sequestration,4 which is an argument for reforesting where we 
can. In any case, if you want to let your chickens live off the 
land, how many will you be able to raise on an acre? Estimates 
vary, but I haven’t been able to find anyone who claims that 
an acre can sustain more than 25 birds without feed—roughly 
1/10 of what an acre supports on the industrial model.
Granted: I’ve made a number of simplifying assumptions, 
the numbers I’ve used are only rough estimates, you might not 
think that chickens fare best when allowed to live off the land, 
and there are various ways to produce feed more sustainably 
(though also less efficiently, and the land allocation problem 
remains). So the point here is not that, if we switch to animal-
friendly agriculture, we’ll see chicken production drop by some 
specific factor. Rather, the point is this. When you couple the 
observations about land use with the ones made earlier—about 
feed-to-flesh conversion ratios, slaughter rates, and recoverable 
byproducts—it should be clear that animal-friendly agriculture 
is dramatically less efficient than industrial agriculture. Hence, 
a switch to animal-friendly agriculture is going to significantly 
reduce how much product is available, which is bound to drive 
up its price. What’s more, there’s little hope that supply will 
eventually catch up. There are plenty of ways to increase the 
supply of animal products, but nearly all of them involve either 
welfare compromises or unacceptable environmental costs. 
We have battery cages, farrowing crates, and feedlots because 
they’re efficient—not because they’re good for chickens, pigs, 
and cows. Animal-friendly operations can’t use these strate-
gies, which means that their only choice is to use more land for 
either growing feed or permitting free-range grazing. And as 
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the considerations above indicate, we’re talking about a lot of 
land—far more than makes environmental sense. 
At present, animal-friendly animal products cost two to 
three times the price of their conventional alternatives. That, 
of course, is still far from their real cost. Simon (2013) esti-
mates that we should add another $1.70 for every dollar of re-
tail animal food sales to account for externalized health care 
and environmental costs of animal agriculture, as well as the 
substantial taxpayer subsidies that keep prices artificially low. 
Some of those externalized costs would be reduced if we were 
to adopt animal-friendly practices—the health care costs, for 
example, are partially due to overconsumption—so let’s cut his 
estimate in half, adding only $0.85 per dollar. In the US, the 
average price of a pound of ground beef is about $4, and the 
animal-friendly stuff goes for about $8. That means that the 
current real cost is nearly $15.
I’m going to assume that, all else equal, we shouldn’t allow 
industries to externalize costs—it isn’t fair to the third parties 
who bear them. Still, taxpayers could continue their subsidies. 
Would that keep prices down?
I doubt it. First, animal-friendly farms operate on razor-thin 
margins because they compete with industrial products. If they 
were only competing with similar farms, they would probably 
raise their prices to provide some financial stability. Second, the 
factors cited above suggest that there would be a fixed ceiling 
on animal-friendly production—only so much will be avail-
able. Hence, there is no reason to expect supply to keep pace 
with population growth, which would drive prices yet higher.
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According to the US Department of Labor, the average 
American spends 12.6% of her income on food.5 Of that, 
roughly 4.2% is devoted to animal products. If the prices of 
those products were to go up by a factor of 3.75—and esti-
mate that I take to be conservative—she would have to spend 
24.15% of her total budget to maintain the same level of ani-
mal product consumption, which is nearly double what she now 
spends. It’s highly unlikely that the average American has this 
much financial flexibility. Hence, she’s bound to have to reduce 
her animal product consumption. The issue isn’t whether, but 
by how much. Moreover, the average American couldn’t sim-
ply reduce her animal product consumption by a factor of 3.75, 
as that would leave her missing a substantial number of calo-
ries (among other things, but let’s use the simplest metric). Get-
ting those calories would cut deeper into the funds available 
for animal products, and so we might estimate that the average 
American could afford only a tenth of the animal products that 
she currently enjoys. If the average American eats three meals 
a day, and consumes some animal product or other at every 
meal, then she’d go from eating animal products 21 times per 
week to eating them twice per week. While that would still be a 
far cry from strict veganism, it’s pretty close relative to current 
patterns of consumption.
The upshot is that when you say that we ought not to sup-
port factory farms, you’re calling for a food system that largely 
prices average consumers out of animal products. On the mod-
el you’re advancing, most people will be eating vegan at least 
5  See http://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/combined/quintile.pdf.
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90% of the time—and more the poorer they are. For short, let’s 
say that they’ll have to eat mostly vegan.6 
The Moral Premise
But suppose you’ve got the financial means to purchase ani-
mal-friendly products, and you regularly purchase them. Given 
the assumptions with which we began, it looks like your hands 
are clean; you aren’t complicit in the horrors of factory farm-
ing. However, you’re avoiding complicity without sharing the 
cost that most people would have to bear, which is eating most-
ly vegan.7 This is wrong. To be clear, the moral claim is not 
that a diet rich in animal-friendly products is wrong because 
it isn’t universalizable—i.e., not everyone could eat as you’re 
eating. That principle is doubly implausible: first, it implies 
that it’s wrong to purchase all sorts of luxury goods, vegan or 
otherwise (decent whiskey, artisan-made cashew “cheese,” a 
private college education); second, it implies that it’s wrong to 
eat highly unusual foods, even if inexpensive, simply because 
they aren’t generally available. Instead, the claim concerns our 
obligations during periods of moral change. 
Moral judgments often involve assessments of what it’s 
reasonable to demand of others, of those sacrifices that are 
6  Through this section, I’ve been assuming that there won’t be various 
technological solutions to the problems created by factory farms: e.g., we 
won’t begin genetically modifying animals so that they aren’t harmed by 
the way we raise and slaughter them; we won’t develop environmentally-
sustainable industrial farms for relatively simple animals, such as oysters 
or shrimp, that we begin eating en masse instead of land animals; in vitro 
meat will remain prohibitively expensive; etc. If the assumption is mistaken, 
then my argument becomes a brief for either eating those products or eating 
mostly vegan. 
7  Someone might object to the idea that this is a cost. By the lights of most 
people, though, it plainly is.
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worthwhile, of how various goods should be balanced. And, of 
course, our sense of what’s reasonable, what’s worthwhile, and 
what matters is influenced by a host of personal and contextual 
factors. Moreover, moral norms impose costs on those who ad-
here to them. Instead of being able to take what you’d like from 
the grocery store, following the Don’t steal norm means that 
you have to live on what you can afford—which might not be 
much. Finally, moral norms impose different costs on people. 
If I’m wealthy, then the costs of following the Don’t steal norm 
are low; if you’re poor, they’re much higher.
Given all this, when the wealthy endorse moral norms that 
impose costs on others, but not on themselves, they should 
wonder whether they’re willing to affirm them because they 
won’t bear the costs that the norms ask others to internalize. (In 
the present case, the thought is something like: “Easy for me 
to say—I can have steak as much as I’d like!”) By bearing the 
costs directly, the wealthy remove a potential defeater for their 
moral belief—namely, that they find it plausible only because 
of their comfortable position. This is the epistemic justification 
for the moral premise.
At the same time, by bearing the cost that most would bear, 
the wealthy signal that the moral change is worth making, that 
it isn’t unreasonable to ask others to internalize the relevant 
costs too. In other words, internalizing the cost signals that 
mere privilege isn’t what explains why the wealthy take the 
cost to be an acceptable one. In part, this matters because it 
gives the wealthy the standing to take morally progressive po-
sitions, which means that some of its value comes from what it 
communicates to others. It indicates respect for those of whom 
morality demands more. But it’s also because of the way that 
signaling matters in addressing collective action problems. 
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When we don’t think that others will sacrifice, it’s harder for us 
to sacrifice. When the wealthy bear the costs that others would 
bear, they remove an important barrier to building coalitions 
that can act on issues of moral importance. This is the signaling 
justification for the moral premise.
Granted, it’s often easier for the wealthy to internalize costs, 
and so you might worry that the wealthy can’t send the ap-
propriate signal without themselves becoming poor. There 
is something to this thought. However, it’s a contingent fact 
about us that we tend to be satisfied by parity with respect to 
action-types, not requiring parity with respect to broader life 
circumstances. When, for example, we recently realized that 
there aren’t enough departmental funds for everyone to travel 
as much as they’d like, we were satisfied by having the funds be 
divided equally, even though the chair’s salary means that this 
arrangement affects his travel plans much less than it affects 
the rest of us. Moreover, requiring poverty would be unrea-
sonable; requiring a similar sacrifice isn’t. This is for a Rawl-
sian reason: requiring poverty from the wealthy might actually 
make the poor worse off. Inequality is less objectionable—and 
perhaps not at all objectionable—when it benefits the least of 
these. Of course, it may be that most actual inequality doesn’t 
benefit the least of these. That, however, is no objection to the 
point I’m making here, which is just that it isn’t reasonable to 
demand equality across the board.
The wealthy might not be obliged to limit their consump-
tion in the future; there might come a day when meat will be 
an ordinary luxury good. However, they’ve got these obliga-
tions for the foreseeable future. If there is ever a change, it will 
come when it’s a general cultural norm that you shouldn’t treat 
animals as they’re treated in factory farms, nor should you sup-
Bob Fischer
203
© Between the Species, 2016
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 19, Issue 1
port those who do. At that point, we will have all judged that 
the cost of these norms is reasonable, and so there won’t be 
any need for the wealthy to signal that it is. So if you think 
that we ought not to support factory farms, and this means that 
the poor will have to eat mostly vegan, then you ought to eat 
mostly vegan—at least until the norm is widely endorsed and 
most accept its costs.
The situation is akin to the one we face concerning climate 
change. We know that we ought to reduce our respective car-
bon footprints, and we know that this places a disproportionate 
burden on the poor. In part, this is because the wealthy can buy 
that reduction via carbon offsets—they don’t have to sacrifice 
their favorite activities. Instead of swapping their Hummers for 
Priuses, or abstaining from joyrides on sunny Sunday after-
noons, the wealthy can have those pleasures and pay others 
to plant trees. Granted, if the wealthy are going to hang on to 
their Hummers, buying carbon offsets is better than not buying 
them. But this is wrong: what they ought to do is share the cost 
that everyone else has to bear—namely, not having Hummers 
at all, nor taking joyrides on sunny Sunday afternoons. Like-
wise, you should usually abstain from animal-friendly animal 
products even if you can afford them.
Objections
Let’s consider a few objections. First, someone might point 
out that not every non-wealthy person will have to give up 
Sunday-afternoon joyrides. Someone might make sacrifices 
elsewhere—perhaps taking public transportation the rest of 
the time, or heating to a much lower temperature during the 
winter, or whatever. Likewise, not every non-wealthy person 
will have to eat mostly vegan. Some people will be willing to 
adjust their lives in other ways to free up funds for meat. Still, 
Bob Fischer
204
© Between the Species, 2016
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 19, Issue 1
most will make this sacrifice. Why should the decisions of the 
majority determine the obligations of the wealthy?
What it’s reasonable to ask of others—and your standing in 
a community—are inherently social phenomena. It’s unreason-
able to ask of others what most people think it’s unreasonable 
to ask of others; likewise, you have standing when the relevant 
community grants it to you. And if most people think that it 
would be unreasonable to expect people to forgo fruits and veg-
etables to afford animal products—or live in worse housing, or 
to live without a car, or whatever—then it’s unreasonable to ask 
as much, and you lack standing insofar as your view commits 
you to that claim. Recall: one reason to limit your animal prod-
uct consumption is to signal to others that it’s worth bearing the 
cost that the Avoid-factory-farmed-products norm requires. By 
not shouldering that burden, the wealthy signal the opposite, 
which is that the good the norm would do isn’t worth the cost 
it asks us to internalize. So either the epistemic and signaling 
concerns aren’t that important, in which case my argument is 
in trouble on independent grounds; or, they are important, and 
the objection misfires for that reason.
Second, someone might argue that the non-wealthy needn’t 
eat mostly vegan, since they could supplement their diets with 
various non-objectionable sources of animal protein—e.g., in-
sects, roadkill, food waste, etc.
There are two ways to take this objection. If the suggestion 
is that the non-wealthy could supplement their diets in these 
ways, then the reply is the same as the one I gave to the previ-
ous objection—namely, that if most people wouldn’t want to 
supplement their diets in these ways, and would regard it as un-
reasonable to expect it of them, then it is, in fact, unreasonable 
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to expect it of them. So, expecting such supplementation won’t 
confirm that your expectations of others aren’t based on your 
relatively privileged position, nor give you standing to take a 
progressive moral position.
If, however, the suggestion is that the wealthy could supple-
ment their diets with insects, roadkill, and their ilk, then the 
point is a fair one, and the wealthy may indeed supplement 
in these ways.8 Notice, though, that this just refines my main 
claim—it doesn’t overturn it. Strictly speaking, my main claim 
isn’t that the wealthy should eat mostly vegan, but that they 
should drastically reduce their support even for animal-friend-
ly animal products. However, since few people are going to 
supplement their diets in these ways, I’ll continue to use the 
phrase “eating mostly vegan,” since it best captures the practi-
cal upshot of my argument.
Third, someone might contend that if there really isn’t any-
thing wrong with animal-friendly agriculture, then the wealthy 
ought to support it, since that’s the only way to sustain a rival to 
the industrial model. By buying animal-friendly products, the 
wealthy preserve a marginal food system in hopes that it will 
eventually become the dominant one.
Granted: if there is nothing wrong with animal-friendly ag-
riculture, then it would be better if that model were to replace 
the current industrial standard. However, we have no obliga-
tion to keep animal-friendly agriculture afloat, whereas we do 
have an obligation not to support—and perhaps even to help 
undermine—industrial animal agriculture. By reducing their 
8  I’m assuming, of course, that none of them are objectionable, and I take 
the assumption to be plausible. In defense of eating insects, see Fischer 
(2016); in defense of eating roadkill, see Bruckner (2015).
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animal product consumption, the wealthy remove a significant 
barrier to collective action: namely, having the non-wealthy 
judge that the moral claims of the wealthy are unreasonable. 
Again, in that way eating mostly vegan aids collective action, 
providing a hard-to-fake signal that the wealthy will cooperate 
with the non-wealthy to end a cruel institution.9 For that reason, 
working against factory farms should take priority over aiding 
animal-friendly operations. 
Fourth, someone might object that my argument generalizes 
in an odd way. If it works, then wealthy consumers shouldn’t 
buy (say) electric cars over gas-powered ones, since others 
can’t afford this more-moral option.
But this doesn’t follow at all. If we shouldn’t buy gas-pow-
ered cars, then my argument implies that the wealthy should 
buy electric. This is because, by so doing, they thereby bear 
the cost that the norm asks us to internalize (more expensive 
vehicles with less pick up relative to their current, gas-powered 
alternatives). And it’s an obligation that’s bolstered by the fact 
that increased demand for electric cars will lower their cost, 
making them available to average consumers. However, the 
same isn’t true of animal products—or so I’ve argued.
Fifth, someone might insist that wealthier consumers don’t 
harm average consumers, and so even if there is some unfair-
ness here, it’s a minor matter.
There are two problems with this. On the one hand, you 
might make the same point about people who drive Hum-
mers. If this point doesn’t excuse them, it doesn’t excuse the 
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relatively wealthy consumer. On the other, there’s a sense in 
which supporting animal-friendly agriculture does harm aver-
age consumers. We’re supposing that average consumers are 
mostly vegan de facto—they’d be happy to enjoy animal prod-
ucts if they could afford them, but often can’t. However, anyone 
who buys animal-friendly products increases demand for them, 
and insofar as supply is limited, drives up their price. So, by 
supporting animal-friendly agriculture, relatively wealthy con-
sumers make it harder for average consumers to get the prod-
ucts they’d like.
This might sound paradoxical, insofar as I’m arguing that 
those with means should eat mostly vegan. Recall, however, 
our assumption that there’s nothing wrong with that animal-
friendly agriculture. The goal here isn’t to defend strict veg-
anism; rather, it’s to argue that even those with means ought 
to reduce their consumption of animal products significantly. 
They can’t so easily buy themselves out of moral wrongdoing. 
Finally, someone might contend that rather than eating 
mostly vegan, the wealthy ought to subsidize the diets of the 
non-wealthy, enabling them to eat more animal products.
This objection stands or falls on an empirical question. I’ve 
argued that animal-friendly animal products aren’t scalable: 
we can only produce so much, even if we switch entirely to 
an animal-friendly model, and this because the ways of in-
creasing productivity involve either welfare compromises or 
unacceptable environmental costs. If that’s right, then an all-
animal-friendly-agriculture world won’t be one in which there 
are extra animal products to subsidize. Instead, everyone will 
have to scale back dramatically. Of course, I might be wrong 
about the empirical premise, in which case the objection is a 
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good one. But if I’m wrong about the empirical premise, then 
the objection also isn’t necessary, as my argument will have 
failed at the first step. 
Conclusion
Given the assumptions with which we began, it’s tempting 
to think that there is nothing wrong with preserving your cur-
rent level of animal product consumption: you just need to “eat 
responsibly.” In so doing, however, you’re dodging the cost that 
most people would have to bear were we to do away with fac-
tory farming—namely, eating mostly vegan. This is wrong. 
So, even if there is nothing intrinsically wrong with supporting 
animal-friendly agriculture, those with the means to support it 
usually shouldn’t.
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